Abstract. There is a deep connection between the behavior of the maximal variation of posterior probabilities over a set of states K and asymptotic properties of repeated games with incomplete information. The paper is concerned with a case of "big" K and specific effects arising in this case (a previous study was mainly focused on finite K). It turns out that for priors with heavy tails the maximal variation and a game value both can grow anomalously fast. A family of functionals (including the Shannon entropy) measuring uncertainty of prior distribution naturally arise to characterize this phenomenon.
Game-theoretical objects.
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information on one side (hereafter RGII) were introduced by R. Aumann and M. Maschler (see [1] , [7] ). The main feature of RGII is a repeated interaction between players forming a mechanism of information transmission from the informed player (P1) to the uninformed player (P2). P1 knows what game they are actually playing and P2 does not know, so he tries to guess the state of art observing P1 actions. Hence P1 should use his strategic advantage not revealing his private information too fast.
RGII Γ N (ρ) is given with: a collection Γ = (K, S, T, {g k } k∈K ), where K is a set of states, S and T are action sets of P1 and P2, g k : S × T → R is a one stage payoff function at the state k; a measure ρ ∈ ∆(K) (∆(A) is the set of all probability measures over A) and a number of stages N ∈ N. To simplify the consideration and to avoid measurability conditions we assume that K, S and T are finite or countable. Before the game starts, a state k ∈ K is chosen randomly according to ρ. P1 is informed on the state k; P2 is not. At n-th stage of the game (n = 1, . . . , N ) P1 and P2 simultaneously select their actions s n ∈ S and t n ∈ T using information they have at this stage, then the actions are announced. At the end of the game P1 receives, and P2 loses
n−1 = H n be the history up to a stage n (H 1 = {∅}). A (randomized) strategy of P1 is σ : K × H → ∆(S), and a strategy of P2 is τ : H → ∆(T ), where H = N n=1 H n . In other words, at each stage the strategy maps the information that player has to the randomized action. P1 wants to maximize his average gain G N (ρ, σ, τ ) = E ρ,σ,τ N n=1 g k (s n , t n ) regardless of the opponent's strategy. The expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure P ρ,σ,τ over K × H N generated by the strategies and ρ.
One says that the game has a value v [Γ N (ρ)] if for any ε > 0 there are strategies σ ε and τ ε such that ∀τ
The strategies σ ε and τ ε are ε-optimal strategies (optimal strategies if ε = 0 is admissible). In particular, if S, T and K are finite, then the players have optimal strategies (all classical results correspond to this situation). If K is countable with finite S and T , then there are ε-optimal strategies. For infinite S and T ε-optimal strategies may fail to exist.
Let Γ NR 1 (ρ) be a so-called non-revealing game associated with Γ. The only difference from one-stage game Γ 1 (ρ) is that P1 "forgets" k, i.e., the class of his strategies is restricted to maps H = H 1 → ∆(S).
Denote by Γ(K) the set of collections Γ such that: the set of states is K; S and T are finite or countable; g = sup k,s,t |g k (s, t)| < ∞; for any ρ ∈ ∆(K) and N ∈ N there are ε-optimal strategies in the games Γ N (ρ) and Γ One of the main problems of the theory is a game value asymptotic behavior as N → ∞. In the case of #K < ∞, (# denotes the number of elements) it is known that for games from Γ(K) the game value can't grow faster than N 1/2 in power-law scale. There are examples of games with such speed of value growth. The aim of this note is to describe the maximal speed of v [Γ N (ρ)] growth for games from Γ(K) without finiteness assumption. Consider the following quantity
(1/2 is subtracted to get α(ρ) = 0 in the classical case #K < ∞). It turns out that for infinite K an "anomalous growth" is possible, i.e., α(ρ) > 0. The main focus will be on countable K, but the approach can be generalized to an arbitrary Polish space.
Maximal variations and game values.
Let ρ n be the posterior distribution of k given a history h n , i.e., ρ n (A) = P ρ,σ,τ ({k ∈ A} | h n ) and ρ 1 = ρ. The sequence {ρ n } N +1
n=1 forms a martingale with respect to the filtration generated by h n (i.e., {ρ n (A)} N +1
n=1 is a martingale for any A ⊂ K).
Let us introduce the following objects: the N -term variation of a sequence of random measures {µ n } N +1 n=1 over K is defined by V N ({µ n }) = E N n=1 |µ n+1 − µ n | (|Φ| denotes the total variation of a signed measure Φ); M ∞ (ρ) is the set of all martingale sequences of random probability measures {µ n } ∞ n=1 over K with non-random µ 1 = ρ (a probability space and a filtration are not fixed); 
If Γ ∈ Γ(K) and K, S and T are finite, then the following estimate holds
, where {ρ n } corresponds to the optimal strategy of P1 (this estimate is due to R. Aumann and M. Maschler, see [1] , [7] ). Without finiteness condition (there may be no optimal strategies) one can get v [Γ N (ρ)] ≤ g ξ #S N (ρ), i.e., the maximal variation bounds the value from above.
For the Bernoulli distribution ρ = (p, 1 − p) (over two-element K) J. Mertens & S. Zamir [2] and B. De Meyer [4] derived an explicit asymptotic formula for the maximal variation ξ
is the density of the standard normal distribution at its p-quantile. In [3] 2 × 2-games (i.e., #S = #T = 2) were constructed such that v [Γ N (ρ)] ∼ ξ ∞ N (ρ) (generalized in [4] to m × m-games, m ∈ N). Thus for #K = 2 one has α(ρ) = 0. The same holds even for finite or countable K and ρ with not too heavy tails, since (see [1] , [7] )
In A. Neyman's paper [6] , that is very close to this note in basic ideas, a variation was estimated by the Shannon entropy:
.
Hence the set of priors ρ with α(ρ) = 0 was significantly extended. But it was unknown what happens if S(ρ) = ∞, and can the class with α(ρ) = 0 be even wider.
Estimates of variation growth.
Consider a more general setting. Let K be the unit interval [0, 1] (or an arbitrary Polish space); let ρ = θ ρ c + (1 − θ)ρ d ∈ ∆(K), θ ∈ [0, 1] be a "prior" distribution decomposed into the continuous component and the discrete one. Similarly to the definition above one can define the maximal variation ξ D N (ρ) ({µ n } is a ∆(K)-valued martingale if for any measurable A ⊂ K the sequence {µ n (A)} is a martingale). The case ρ = ρ d corresponds to finite or countable K (one needs to enumerate atoms of ρ by elements of K). Let us define the family of uncertainty measures of
Theorem. For any D ∈ (N \ {1}) ∪ {∞} the following two-sided estimate holds
where ρ
is the Dirac measure concentrated at a point l 0 ∈ K that is not an atom of ρ d , and b θ is the Bernoulli distribution with success probability θ. There is an explicit formula for purely continuous prior distribution
If purely discrete prior distribution satisfies
Remark (main ingredients of the proof). The estimates (1) and (2) are consequences of the mutual singularity of the components ρ d and ρ c and the martingale property. To prove (3) for finite D one can construct a martingale
is some disjoint measurable partition of K such that ν(B The estimate (4) is based on the representation of the variation of a scalar martingale derived by B. De Meyer in [4] . Combining this representation with large deviation estimates (similar to S. Bernstein inequalities) one can deduce (4).
To prove (5) one can adapt the construction of {π n } ∞ n=1 to the discrete case. For discrete ν ∈ ∆(K) a partition {B d ν } may fail to exist, but a partition "close" to {B d ν } may be chosen. To control that the corresponding martingale {π n } is "close" to {π n } ∞ n=1 recurrent estimates are necessary, and they lead to (5).
The game with anomalous value growth.
It is shown above that ξ ∞ N (ρ) can grow anomalously (faster than √ N ), but this doesn't imply the existence of games from Γ(K) with anomalous value growth (α(ρ) > 0). Here an example of such game G N (ρ) is constructed. Let g 0 (0, 0) = −g 0 (1, 0) = 3, g 0 (1, 1) = −g 0 (0, 1) = 1 and g 1 (0, 0) = −g 1 (1, 0) = g 1 (1, 1) = −g 1 (0, 1) = 2. Corresponding 2×2-RGII with action sets and set of states coinciding with {0, 1} = Z 2 was investigated in [3] and is mentioned above.
Suppose that K is finite or countable. Let us describe the RGII G N (ρ) informally. Each stage of this game n = 1, . . . , N is suitable to represent as being played in two steps. At the first step P1 selects a finite subset X ⊂ K, and P2 selects finite Y ⊂ K, then X ∩ Y is told to P2. At the second step if k ∈ X, then they play in 2 × 2-game corresponding to g 1 , and to g 0 if k ∈ K \ X (that is P1 and P2 select h and f from Z 2 , respectively, and the contribution of this stage to the total gain of P1 is g χ(X,k) (h, f ), where χ(X, k) = 1 if k ∈ X, and 0 otherwise). Hence G N (ρ) corresponds to the collection G = (K, S, T, g), where S = {(X, h) ∈ 2 K × Z 2 | #X < ∞}, T = {(Y, f ), Y ∈ 2 K , f : 2 Y → Z 2 | #Y < ∞, }, and pay-off function g k ((X, h), (Y, f )) = g χ(X,k) (h, f (X ∩Y )). Note that S and T are countable or finite.
Using the idea of reduction of RGII to the martingale optimization problem from B. De Meyer's paper [5] one can prove the following theorem. 
